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About me 
• Recent MSc (technology) graduate from Aalto University 
• Have been involved in projects focusing on military combat modeling 
for about 2 years 
• Research interests include in no specific order: 
• Physical modeling of effects of weapons 
• Risk analysis approach to combat modeling 
• Tactics in complex games 
 
E-mail juho.roponen@gmail.com 
This presentation 
1. Introduction 
2. What is adversarial risk analysis and why should you care? 
3. Possible uses in context of combat simulation models 
4. Example case 
5. Questions and answers 
 
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) 
• Combines statistical risk analysis with game theory 
• Suitable for analyzing situations where two or more 
intelligent actors with conflicting interests make decisions 
under uncertain outcomes 
• Current uses include, for example, counter-terrorism and 
corporate finance 
Why is ARA interesting in the context of 
military combat models? 
• Originally developed for counter-terrorism 
• Well suited for representing two hostile actors  
• Has not been applied to combat simulation models yet 
• Generic enought to be applicable to wide variety of problems 
• Overcomes many problems that are present with game theory 
solutions 
• Can represent opponents that do not adhere to minmax rationality princible 
• No need to assume the actors share some common knowledge 
Possible uses – Simulating chains of events 
• Usually requires compromise between scale and amount of 
detail 
• Has already been done using methods of probabilistic risk 
analysis 
• The methodology can be used with many different 
simulation tools 
• Potentially useful in data farming 
Modeling the effects of military deceit 
• Difficult to predict and simulate using existing software 
• Often relies only on user’s expert opinion 
• Commonly used solution is wargaming which has its own problems 
• Decisions in a game do not always correspond with decisions in the real world 
• Often captures typical decision making instead of optimal decision making 
• ARA methodology can be used to complement these expert opinion 
approaches 
• ARA makes it very easy to model cases in which the adversary is fed 
misinformation about strength of opposing forces 
Other possible usage cases 
•Distribution of resources 
•Modeling decision making 
•Supporting decision making 
Limitations of ARA 
• Decisions modeled need to be quantifiable 
• Number of possible choices needs to be limited 
• Length of decision chains needs to be limited 
• Can only predict the outcomes of decisions if the decision-
maker’s logic is known 
Example case 
• Two adversaries: the Defender and the Attacker 
• The Defender has two targets he wants to protect 
• 40 soldiers at the first target 
• 20 soldiers at the second target 
• The Attacker can choose which target to attack 
• The Defender has the option of moving soldiers secretly between the 
targets before the Attacker has a chance to act 
• There is a chance the Attacker will find out about the troop 
movement, but if he doesn’t he will be acting on incomplete 
information 
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Example case from the Defender’s point of view 
• Attacker is assumed a utility maximizer 
• The expected utility gained from the attack by the Attacker is 
 
 
 
 
• The Defender’s expected utility is similar 
 
 
 
Influence diagram from the Attacker’s point of view 
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The Defender’s utility function 
• The Defender considers target 1 twice as valuable as target 2 
• Specifically he assesses that the utility gained (in this case lost) from 
the attack is 
 
 
• It is not enough for the Defender to know the utilities gained from all 
the possible combinations of choices and chance if he does not know 
what the Attacker will choose 
 
 
Defender’s estimations on troop strengths 
• The Attacker has at least 20 men but no more than 35, and the 
Defender thinks that the most likely number is 30, so he fits a 
triangular distribution. 
• The Attacker thinks the Defender has 36 to 44 men at Target 1 and 18 
to 22 men at Target 2 (with all values equally probable). 
• The Attacker has probability 𝑝𝑅 = 0.1 of finding out about the 
Defender’s troop movement. 
The Attacker’s utility function 
• The Defender needs to estimate the Attacker’s utility function as well 
• He estimates that it is similar to his own, but is not certain that the 
Attacker places the exact same value on the targets 
 
 
• 𝑢1 and 𝑢1 were assumed to follow uniform distribution to make 
calculations simpler 
 
Solving the problem step by step 
1. Calculate the success probabilities and expected losses for both 
sides for all the possible combinations of strengths of both sides as 
perceived by the attacker taking into account the fact that the 
Attacker detects the Defender’s troop movement on probability 𝑝𝑅. 
 
Solving the problem step by step 
2. Calculate the Attacker’s expected utilities 𝜓𝐴 for attacking and not 
attacking for all possible strengths of the Attacker’s force taking into 
account the uncertainties with 𝑢𝐴. 
 
3. Compare the expected utilities to get an estimate for the probability 
of an attack on each target for each possible strength of the 
Attacker. 
 
Solving the problem step by step 
4. Consider the probability of an attack with a specific strength of the 
attacker and the probability for each of those strengths to calculate 
𝑝𝐷 𝑎 𝑑, 𝑅 . 
 
5. Calculate 𝜓𝐷 for all possible values of a. 
 
6. Use 𝑝𝐷 𝑎 𝑑, 𝑅  to determine the decision d which maxizes his 
expected utility. 
 
Execution and results 
• A lightweight simulation model capable of calculating duels between 
two forces was used 
• The step by step algorithm was made into program code 
• The maximum utility gained by the Defender was -6.7 
• The optimal choice was to move 18 soldiers from target 1 to target 2 
Recap 
1. Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) is a methodology for estimating the 
actions of a rational adversary 
2. It can be used for some combat modeling problems that are 
difficult or impossible to solve otherwise 
3. It’s a very good tool estimating the effectiveness of military deceit 
Questions? 
E-mail juho.roponen@gmail.com 
